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by permitting evidence of trade custom and past dealings, future
courts will be able to more consistently effectuate the intent and
expectation of the parties and construe their agreements in accor18 7
dance with commercial realities.
James M. Ebetino
N.Y.U.C.C. § 4-302: Agreement between depositary and payor
banks varying midnight deadline rule binding on payee
Section 4-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code) imposes a duty upon a payor bank in possession of a demand item 18
to either settle the item or send notice of its dishonor before the
midnight deadline.1 8s Recognizing the need for commercial flexibility, the Code permits variation of this provision by agreement
of all interested parties to the transaction, provided the agreement
does not discharge the bank from its obligations of good faith and
ordinary care.1 90 It is unclear, however, to what extent a depositary
Stiles Co., 306 N.Y. 288, 289, 118 N.E.2d 104, 105 (1954).
167 Speaking to the status of arbitration clauses after the enactment of the Code, one
commentator observed:
[I]f the higher threshold for enforceability of arbitration clauses has survived the
enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, the Code's liberalization of contract
formation rules may actually increase the risk that a party may find itself bound
to a contract lacking. . . a term that he assumed, by virtue of trade, custom or
practice, to be a part of his deal.
Collins, supra note 185, at 740.
I" The Code defines an "item" as "any instrument for the payment of money even
though it is not negotiable," but not including money or documentary drafts. N.Y.U.C.C. §§
4-104(1)(g), 4-302 (McKinney 1964).
"9 N.Y.U.C.C. § 4-302(a) (McKinney 1964). Section 4-302(a) provides that "a payor
bank ... is accountable for the amount of a demand item ... if the bank... does not pay

or return the item or send notice of dishonor until after its midnight deadline." Id. A bank's
midnight deadline is deemed to be "midnight on its next banking day following the banking
day on which it receives the relevant item or notice or from which the time for taking action
commences to run, whichever is later." Id. § 4-104(1)(h).
190 Id. § 4-103(1). Federal Reserve regulations, clearinghouse rules and similar enactments have the effect of agreements under § 4-103(1), whether or not all interested parties
have specifically assented to their applicability. Id. § 4-103(2); see H. BAILEY, BRADY ON
BANK CHECKS 14-15 (5th ed. 1979). The article 4 provision relating to agreements between
parties to a transaction differs somewhat from the general Code provision. Under § 1-201(3),
the provisions of the Code may be varied "except that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care . . . may not be disclaimed by agreement." Because § 4103(1) expressly limits agreements only by the standards of good faith and ordinary care, it
has been suggested that "in the area of bank collections, the bank may contract out of
duties of diligence and reasonableness to the extent that such duties are not comprehended
in the concept of 'ordinary care.'" Leary, Check Handling Under Article Four of the Uniform Commercial Code, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 331, 342 (1965). See generally J. WHirr & R.
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bank's agreement with a payor bank will be binding upon a payee.
Recently, in David Graubart,Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 9 ' the
Court of Appeals held that a payor bank is not accountable 9 2 to a
payee when, pursuant to an agreement with the depositary bank,
the payor bank retains a previously dishonored check beyond the
midnight deadline.'
David Graubart, Inc. was the payee of a check drawn by the
Prins Diamond Company on its account at the Bank Leumi Trust
Company. The payee deposited the check in the National Bank of
North America, which passed it through clearinghouse channels to
the payor bank.' 0 ' When the check was returned by Bank Leumi
for insufficient funds, the payee redeposited the check with its
bank, which routed it directly to Bank Leumi with instructions
that the payor bank was to remit its cashier's check when the item
was paid. 9 5 An "advice to customer" slip was sent by the depositary bank to the payee indicating that credit would be given upon
552-58 (2d ed. 1980). Where an
agreement, otherwise valid under § 4-103(1), serves to disclaim a bank's responsibility for its
own negligence, however, it will be nullified by the courts. See, e.g., Sunshine v. Banker's
Trust Co., 34 N.Y.2d 404, 410, 314 N.E.2d 860, 863-64, 358 N.Y.S.2d 113, 119 (1974); New
York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 41 App.
Div. 2d 912, 913, 343 N.Y.S.2d 538, 540 (1st Dep't 1973) (per curiam).
19148 N.Y.2d 554, 399 N.E.2d 930, 423 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1979), rev'g, 66 App. Div. 2d 659,
410 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1st Dep't 1978).
92 "Accountability" under § 4-302, see note 189 supra, is synonymous with liability.
Rock Island Auction Sales v. Empire Packing Co., 32 111. 2d 269, 204 N.E.2d 721 (1965). The
Rock Island court suggested that the term was used to distinguish a payee's damages under
§ 4-302 from those incurred as a result of provisional settlements between banks in the
collection process. 204 N.E.2d at 723. It has been contended, however, that "accountability"
implies a greater degree of responsibility: While failure to return an item within the specified time limits renders the payor bank liable for the face amount of the item, Met Frozen
Food Corp. v. National Bank, 89 Misc. 2d 1033, 1038, 393 N.Y.S.2d 643, 647 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1977); see United States v. Loskocinski, 403 F. Supp. 75 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), the
measure of damages imposed on a collecting bank for its failure to exercise ordinary care in
the handling of an item is the "amount of the item reduced by an amount which could not
have been realized by the use of ordinary care," N.Y.U.C.C. § 4-103(5) (McKinney 1964).
193 48 N.Y.2d at 561, 399 N.E.2d at 934, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 903-04.
94 Id. at 557, 399 N.E.2d at 932, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 901. A clearinghouse is an association
of banks which facilitates the transferral of checks and the settling of balances due among
members. The association is the fiduciary representative of member banks. See 8 MICHIE,
BANKS AND BANKING 331 & nn.1 & 2 (1971).
19- 48 N.Y.2d at 557, 399 N.E.2d at 932, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 901. Direct resubmission of
checks by a collecting bank to a payor bank, bypassing clearinghouse channels, is a permissible method of presentment under the Code. N.Y.U.C.C. § 4-204(2)(a) (McKinney 1964).
The practice has been deemed "justified by the need for speed, the general responsibility of
banks, Federal Deposit Insurance protection and other reasons." Id. Official Comment 2.
SUMMERS, THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
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payment.' 96 When the drawer failed to deposit sufficient funds
within seven banking days, Bank Leumi returned the check to the
depositary bank as "uncollectible.' 1 9 7 During this period, however,
the drawer made an assignment for the benefit of creditors,
thereby precluding the payee from obtaining payment on the instrument. 98 The payee brought suit against the payor bank, alleging that its failure to return the resubmitted check to the depositary bank within the midnight deadline rendered the payor bank
accountable. The trial court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment, 99 and the plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed, holding that factual questions existed whether the actions of the payor bank were customary in the
banking community and whether direct resubmission of the previously dishonored check with the "advice to customer" slip constituted an agreement to set aside the midnight deadline rule.200
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and granted summary judgment for the defendant, holding that a payee has no
cause of action against a payor bank that relies on the apparent
authority of the depositary bank.2 01 Judge Fuchsberg, writing for a
unanimous Court, reasoned that the payor bank's conformance
with the terms of its agreement with the depositary bank would
relieve it of accountability under section 4-302 if the assent of the
payee and the reasonableness of the agreement could be established. 0 2 The Court found the requisite assent of the payee from
1" 48 N.Y.2d at 557, 399 N.E.2d at 932, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
197Id.

198Id.
19 Id. at 558, 399 N.E.2d at 933, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
200 66 App. Div. 2d at 660, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
201 48 N.Y.2d at 558, 399 N.E.2d at 933, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 902. The Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court's finding that there was a triable question of fact whether the holding of previously dishonored checks by a payor bank was a customary banking practice. Id.

at 559, 399 N.E.2d at 933, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 902. In support of its crossmotion for summary
judgment, the defendant-payor bank submitted an affadavit of its assistant vice president
asserting that, based upon his personal knowledge of banking practice, the retention of previously dishonored checks beyond the midnight deadline was an industry custom. In reply,
counsel for the payee submitted an affirmation contesting the existence of such a commercial usage. This affirmation was held to be insufficient to raise a question of fact since it was
not based on personal knowledge of the facts. Id.; see CPLR 3212(b) (1970); 4 WK&M
3212.09, at 32-167. Moreover, since all relevant dates were conceded for the purposes of
summary judgment, there were no factual issues to be presented to the jury. 48 N.Y.2d at

559, 399 N.E.2d at 933, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
o2 48 N.Y.2d at 561-62, 399 N.E.2d at 935, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 904. Section 4-108 of the
Code permits a collecting bank to extend the Code's time limits for up to an additional
banking day without the consent of an interested person in order to secure payment.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:788

the agency relationship created between a payee and its depositary
bank upon presentment of an item for collection.2 0 3 Furthermore,
the Court concluded, the interbank agreement was reasonable
since there was no specific evidence of bad faith or lack of ordinary
care2 04 and the agreement did not violate the underlying purpose
of the midnight deadline. 0 5
It is submitted that the Leumi Court has unduly expanded the
Code-created agency relationship arising from the presentment of
a check. Under the Code, a depositary bank has actual authority to
enter into agreements embodying customary collection practices. 206
N.Y.U.C.C. § 4-108(1) (McKinney 1964). This provision was unavailable to the Leumi defendants, however, since delays by a payor bank are excused only if "caused by interruption
of communication facilities, suspension of payments by another bank, war, emergency conditions, or other circumstances beyond the control of the bank provided it exercises such
diligence as the circumstances require." Id. § 4-102(2).
203 48 N.Y.2d at 561, 399 N.E.2d at 934, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 903; see note 206 and accompanying text infra. The Leumi Court determined that Leaderbrand v. Central State Bank,
202 Kan. 450, 450 P.2d 1 (1969), cited by the defendant, was "unavailing." 48 N.Y.2d at 55960, 399 N.E.2d at 933, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 902-03. In Leaderbrand, the court reasoned that
since § 3-511(4) of the Code excused further notice of dishonor where "drafts" were once
dishonored by "nonacceptance," the same rule was applicable to the dishonor of checks by
"nonpayment." 450 P.2d at 8-9. Therefore, no notice of dishonor was required where an
item had been previously returned for insufficient funds. Id. The Court in Leumi rejected
this conclusion, finding that "[s]ince it would be futile to present for payment a draft that
has been dishonored by nonacceptance . . . such presentment and further notice are excused as superfluous. In contrast, a demand item such as a check may eventually be paid if
resubmitted at a time when the drawer's account has an adequate balance." 48 N.Y.2d at
559-60, 399 N.E.2d at 933, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 903 (emphasis in original).
1" 48 N.Y.2d at 562, 399 N.E.2d at 935, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 904. The Court refused to
imply bad faith or lack of ordinary care and dismissed any presumption of collusion between the drawer and payor bank from the mere fact that, at the time of the assignment for
the benefit of creditors, the drawer was indebted to Leumi. Id.
305 Id.
at 563, 399 N.E.2d at 935-36, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 905. The purpose of the midnight
deadline is to promptly firm up provisional credits received by intermediary banks. See
N.Y.U.C.C. § 4-213 & Official Comment 9 (McKinney 1964). Because the depositary bank
had forwarded the check directly to the payor bank, thus obviating the need for provisional
credits, the Leumi Court reasoned that the purpose of the midnight deadline rule was not
violated. 48 N.Y.2d at 563, 399 N.E.2d at 935-36, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
26 See N.Y.U.C.C. § 4-201(1) (McKinney 1964). Section 4-201(1) provides that
"[u]nless a contrary intent clearly appears and prior to the time that a settlement given by a
collecting bank for an item is or becomes final. . . the bank is an agent or sub-agent of the
owner of the item. . . ." Id. Under common-law agency principles, the actual authority of
an agent to bind his principal may be created expressly or implied by conduct on the part of
the principal that reasonably leads the agent to believe that he is authorized to act. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7, Comment c (1958). The New York courts have consistently held that to effectuate the authority conferred, on an agent, the agent has implied
authority to act in accordance with the customs and practices of the particular industry or
trade. See, e.g., Peter Pan Mfg. Corp. v. Lady Royal Mfg. Co., 272 App. Div. 418, 71 N.Y.S.
97 (1st Dep't 1947); Standard Oil Co. v. Siraco, 226 App. Div. 266, 235 N.Y.S. 1 (3d Dep't
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Where a custom is found to exist, the payee's assent to the interbank agreement may be implied under general agency principles.20 7 In suggesting that the depositary bank has apparent authority to bind the payee to even noncustomary banking practices
merely by virtue of the bank-customer relationship, however, the
Leumi Court has effectively discharged the payor bank from any
duty under section 4-301 unless bad faith or a lack of ordinary care
is shown.
It is suggested that a depositary bank's liability for exceeding
its actual authority should not affect a payee's direct rights against
a payor bank.0 8 Where a particular banking practice does not rise
to the level of a commercial usage, the payee should not be deemed
to have impliedly consented to such an interbank agreement, and
the strict rule of accountability should apply.2 09 By cloaking the
depositary bank with apparent authority, the Leumi Court has removed the payor bank's burden of proving that the modifying
agreement embodied a commercial usage, since the depositary
bank's authority may be predicated solely on the payee's voluntary
establishment of banking relations. Notwithstanding the need for
flexibility in the collection process, an extension of this approach
to cases where a trade usage cannot be established appears to be
an unintended curtailment of a payee's article-four rights.
Thomas M. Cerabino
1929); accord, Demarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 844 (2d Cir. 1968); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF AGENCY § 36 (1958).
207 See note 206 supra.
208 The availability of remedies against the depositary bank for violation of an article 4
provision under general agency principles was not intended to limit payor bank accountability under § 4-302. Accountability of a payor bank for the retention of a demand item beyond
the midnight deadline is not dependent on agency principles; it is expressly created in § 4302 as a direct right of the payee against the payor bank. N.Y.U.C.C. § 4-201, Official Comment 4 (McKinney 1964).
209 One rationale for permitting suspension of the midnight deadline by an agreement
evincing a commercial usage is that such a practice allows parties to "advantage themselves
of the 'wisdom born of accumulated experience.'" 48 N.Y.2d at 560, 399 N.E.2d at 934, 423
N.Y.S.2d at 903 (quoting Banker's Trust Co. v. J.V. Dowler & Co., 47 N.Y.2d 128, 134, 390
N.E.2d 766, 769, 417 N.Y.S.2d 47, 51 (1979)). It is clear, however, that such indirect agreements must be applied discriminately. The comments to § 4-103 of the Code provide:
Direct agreements between a bank and its customer would ordinarily be used
in the area of bank-customer relationships ....
The new statutory sanction for
indirect agreements binding remote parties applies principally . . . [where] the
use of direct agreements is impracticable and in which the indirect agreement has
heretofore had neither legislative sanction nor judicial approval.
N.Y.U.C.C. § 4-103, commentary at 518 (McKinney 1964).

